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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Hermeneutics, human sciences and health: linking theory and practice
JONATHAN A SMITH
Birkbeck University of London, UK
Abstract
This paper considers the relationship between hermeneutic theory and qualitative empirical research in the human sciences.
I suggest that the human sciences can offer a useful crucible for thinking again about some of the ideas in hermeneutics. I
then provide a small piece of data from an empirical study I conducted on identity change during the transition to
motherhood and show how the data and analysis can be ‘‘re-illuminated’’ when thought of in terms of ideas from the
hermeneutic writing of Schleiermacher, Heidegger and Gadamer. Finally, I suggest a project that would go round one
particular hermeneutic circle in the different direction, using empirical research in the human sciences to further extend and
develop hermeneutic theory.
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Introduction
In this paper, I take the opportunity to reflect on the
relationship between qualitative empirical health
research and theoretical writing in hermeneutics. I
will do this by taking some ideas in hermeneutic
theory, thinking about how they can be applied to
human sciences and then employing them to look at
some data from one of my empirical studies. Emer-
ging from the paper, also, will be the suggestion for a
role for contemporary human science research in
itself helping develop further hermeneutic theory.
Hermeneutics, human sciences and health
While it can be argued that there is a close connec-
tion between hermeneutics and human sciences,
actually the relationship is complicated. Hermeneu-
tics has the much longer history, beginning as the
theory to help the interpretation of biblical texts and
then gradually extending its remit to concerns with
the interpretation of a much wider range of texts.
Dilthey coined the term human sciences to distin-
guish a form of intellectual activity, which was
different from that practiced in the natural sciences.
In fact, when one looks at the key writings in
hermeneutics, while the range of texts that form
their subject matter has expanded considerably
beyond those of the bible, the primary concern is
with the humanities: history, law, literature and the
arts.
By contrast, I would see the primary disciplines for
contemporary, self-defined, human sciences forming
a quite different set*made up primarily of health
and nursing, psychology and education. However
more specifically, this human science is primarily
formed by groups of researchers who choose to
differentiate themselves from the quantitative main-
stream parts of their discipline. They are concerned
centrally with human lived experience and, when
conducting empirical projects, favour qualitative
methodologies. This project is at the heart of the
annual International Human Science Research Con-
ference.1
Therefore, we have an interesting situation where
hermeneutics is offered as an important intellectual
touchstone for contemporary human sciences re-
search and yet the type of work that preoccupied the
hermeneutic theorists appears rather different to that
conducted by current human science researchers. So
what does a hermeneutics written for one set of
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disciplines have to say to the new kids on the blocks,
the new human sciences as practiced today?
It can be said that the work done in the new
human sciences is similar to and different from that
done in the older human studies or humanities. Both
sets of disciplines are primarily concerned with the
qualitative analysis of textual material derived from
human agents. However, there are also significant
differences. The humanities that offered hermeneu-
tics its challenge consists of texts, which are usually
constructed self-consciously for a public purpose
and at a historical distance from the analyst. The fact
that the contemporary analyst is still working with
the old text also speaks to its longevity*it has stood
the test of time. Thus, for example the historian
today may be faced with interpreting a text written
in, and recording events happening in, the middle
ages. Today’s literary theorist can be trying to make
sense of a sonnet written self-consciously as a piece
of art by Shakespeare in the 16th century.
By contrast, the human science health researcher
today enlists participants in a study on their experi-
ence of a chronic health condition. The researcher
talks to the participant/patient in real time. The
patient attempts to convey to the researcher what it
is like for them to be ill. The researcher records and
transcribes the resultant conversation and then
analyses the subsequent transcript.
The human science researcher is looking at a text
but it seems to me that that text is rather different
from that more usually looked at by the literary
theorist or historian. The text is explicitly about the
person’s personal experience; it has not been self-
consciously produced as a public document and it
would not exist if it were not for the researcher’s
invitation. It is likely to be fleeting in terms of its life
expectancy and there is a lack of historical or other
distance between author and ‘‘reader’’ (interpreter).
I am here of course making a contrast between
typical cases. Some of the documents examined by
some researchers in the humanities will be personal
documents not intended for public display. Some-
times a literary critic will analyse a poem written by a
contemporary. Some human science researchers
analyse literary texts. And so on. Thus, distinctions
are fuzzy rather than hard and fast. However, I think
the general thrust of the contrast holds true.
I think there is considerable scope for developing,
and extending hermeneutic theory to help its appli-
cation to the activities of researchers in the human
sciences I am referring to above. Actually, some of
the potential for this development already lies in
some of the writings of the key theorists themselves.
Thus, it is extremely interesting to look again at
some of the primary texts in hermeneutics and see
how they speak to qualitative research studies in
psychology, health and education rather than to
history and aesthetics and law.
Therefore, in the next part of the paper, I will
examine some ideas in the hermeneutics writings in
relation to human science research. Afterwards I will
pick these ideas up and think of them in relation to
some of my own empirical work.
Let us begin with an intellectual tussle that
occurred between two major hermeneutic writers,
Schleiermacher and Gadamer, over the nature of the
hermeneutic process.
A conversation between Schleiermacher and
Gadamer
Schleiermacher (1998) suggested that reading a text
involved a dual process, a parallel concern with
language and with the author, with what he de-
scribed as ‘‘grammatical interpretation’’ and ‘‘psy-
chological interpretation’’:
As every utterance has a dual relationship, to the
totality of language and to the whole thought of its
originator, then all understanding also consists of
the two moments, of understanding the utterance
as derived from language, and as a fact in the
thinker . . . Every person is on the one hand a
location in which a given language forms itself in
an individual manner, on the other their discourse
can only be understood via the totality of lan-
guage. But then the person is also a spirit which
continually develops, and their discourse is only
one act of this spirit of connection with the other
acts. (pp. 89)
For Schleiermacher, interpretation is not a matter
of following mechanical rules. Rather it is a craft
or art involving the combination of a range of skills,
including intuition. Part of the aim of the inter-
pretative process is to understand the writer as
well as the text and Schleiermacher suggested that
if one has engaged in a detailed comprehensive
holistic analysis, one can end up with ‘‘an under-
standing of the utterer better than he understands
himself’’.
Gadamer (1990) is critical of what he describes as
Schleiermacher’s psychologizing, arguing that when
reading a text we are not concerned with the
intention of the author but with the meaning content
in the material itself:
Understanding means primarily to understand the
content of what is being said and only secondarily
to isolate and understand another’s meaning as
such (p. 294).
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Gadamer is also sceptical of the possibility of
recreating the intention of the author because of the
historical gap. Thus, interpretation is a dialogue
between past and present:
The essential nature of the historical spirit consists
not in the restoration of the past but in thought-
ful meditation with contemporary life (pp. 168
169).
The aim should not be to relive the past but rather
learn anew from it in the light of the present.
I think Gadamer is astute, for example, when
thinking about the response to a piece of art or a
literary text. So when I read or attend a performance
of a play by Shakespeare, the meaning or ‘‘truth’’ of
the piece does not primarily lie in the playwright’s
intention but rather in the impact of the themes of
the play on me living at this point in time. Shake-
speare is classically renewed and recreated every
time it is performed and its essential meaning cannot
be determined in an intention of the author.
However, when it comes to the analysis of texts
derived from participants in current human science
research projects, to me Schleiermacher suddenly
sounds contemporary. He is attempting a holistic
analysis of the interpretative process. The text is
determined both by the linguistic community the
writer is socialized into but also by the individual
work the individual does with the language. Thus,
Schleiermacher bridges the essentialist and discur-
sive divide, which bedevils so much writing in the
social sciences.
Moreover, I have to say I feel in agreement with
Schleiermacher that when I read a transcript from a
patient with a chronic health condition, I am trying
to make sense of the words used but I am also trying
to make sense of the person who has said those
words. In this case we tend to assume that what the
participant says is at least in part a reflection of what
he/she thinks about the topic we have raised and
which is also of existential moment to the person.
Admittedly, that relationship is not entirely
straightforward, e.g. there may be difficulties and
resistances in expression, but nonetheless, there is a
relationship. Thus, here the separation between what
the author intended and what the work means may
make less sense. A part of the truth or meaning of
a statement is contained in, and consonant with,
what the person is intending to tell me about the
experience they are undergoing.
Again sounding modern, Schleiermacher indicates
that what enables us to make sense of another person
through what would today be called ‘‘intersubjectiv-
ity’’:
. . . depends on the fact that every person, besides
being an individual themself, has a receptivity for
all other people. But this itself seems only to rest
on the fact that everyone carries a minimum of
everyone else within themself, and divination is
consequently excited by comparison with oneself
(pp. 9293).
Therefore, the participant, like me, is a unique
individual worthy of an idiographic, holistic analysis.
At the same time, however, there is the possibility of
bridging the divide between selves because we are all
at the same time part of a larger whole, a collectivity
that allows the possibility of mutual understanding.
The hermeneutic circle: part and whole
The hermeneutic circle is perhaps the most resonant
idea in hermeneutic theory and argues for the
dynamic relationship between the part and the
whole, at a whole series of levels. To understand
the part, you look to the whole; to understand the
whole, you look to the part. While this has been
criticized from a logical perspective because of
its inherent circularity, analytically in terms of
describing the process of interpretation it seems
potent. As suggested, the part and the whole that
can be considered in the relationship are multi-
farious, among the possibilities:
The part The whole
The single word The sentence in which the
word is embedded
The single extract The complete text
The particular text The complete oeuvre
The single episode The complete life
Clearly part of the attractiveness of the herme-
neutic circle is that is speaks to a non-linear style of
analysis, and to the possibility of constantly digging
deeper with ones interpretation. Of course, one
has to balance this with a large dose of pragmatism;
the final interpretation may never be reached as the
circle could theoretically go on forever. Thus, the
skill is in deciding when to come out of the circle and
commit oneself to speaking or writing, to deciding
that one has an interpretation that is good enough.
Another hermeneutic circle: the dynamic
between researcher and participant
The hermeneutic circle above describes the relation-
ship between different aspects of the object the
interpreter is interpreting. An equally important
circle, though less comprehensively discussed in the
classic texts, describes the relationship between the
interpreter and that object of interpretation.
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I start where I am at one point on the circle,
caught up in my concerns, influenced by my
preconceptions, shaped by my experience and ex-
pertise. In moving from this position, I attempt to
either bracket or at least acknowledge my precon-
ceptions before I go round to an encounter with a
research participant at the other side of the circle.
Whatever my previous concerns or positions, I have
moved from a point where I am the focus to one
where the participant is the focus as I attend closely
to the participant’s story, facilitate the participant
uncovering his/her experience. This requires an
intense attentiveness to and engagement with the
participant as he/she speaks. Of course, this is only a
simplified version of what is a complex dynamic
process and this is not the place to spell out those
complexities. For example, see Dahlberg, Drew and
Nystrom (2001) for more on the qualities of open-
ness required here.
Having concluded the conversation, I continue the
journey round the circle back to where I started. So I
return home to analyze the material I collected from
the perspective I started from, influenced by my
prior conceptions and experience. However, I am
also irretrievably changed because of the encounter
with the new, my participant and his/her account.
Then I engage in movement round a virtual mini-
circle where, in my home location, I mentally take on
again a conversation with my participant, as I rehear
his/her story, ask questions of it, try to make sense
of it. Indeed the various actions inherent in the
hermeneutic circle between part and whole, as
outlined in the previous section, take place in this
cognitive space at home base.
Moreover, I may later even choose to go round the
research relationship circle again, to literally revisit
the participant and engage in another conversation
with them about my interpretation*to have a literal
interpretative dialogue about my virtual interpreta-
tive dialogue.
Heidegger (1962) and Gadamer (1990) were both
particularly concerned with one aspect of this pro-
cess, the role of presuppositions in interpretation.
Let us start with Heidegger:
Whenever something is interpreted as something,
the interpretation will be founded essentially upon
the fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.
An interpretation is never a presupposition-
less apprehending of something presented to us
(pp. 191192).
Thus, the reader, analyst or listener brings their
fore-conception to the encounter and cannot help
but look at the new stimulus in the light of their
own prior experience. Heidegger’s account has been
drawn on to invoke a particular stance to the
researcher’s position in human inquiry where one
articulates one’s preconceptions or starting position
at the beginning of a paper and this will, therefore,
allow the reader to understand the interpretative
account which follows.
However look at what Heidegger goes on to say:
Our first, last, and constant task in interpreting is
never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight, and
fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies
and popular conceptions, but rather to make
the scientific theme secure by working out the
fore-structures in terms of the things themselves
(p. 195).
The fore structure is always there but it in fact is in
danger of presenting an obstacle to interpretation.
Therefore, priority should be given to the new object
rather than to ones preconceptions. In addition, note
the sequence. Here the suggestion seems to be that
one makes sense of these fore-structures in terms of
the things themselves. In other words while fore-
structure may ontologically precede encounter with
‘‘the things’’, understanding may work the other way,
from ‘‘the thing’’ to the fore-structure. When en-
countering a text, I do not necessarily know which
part of my fore-structure is relevant. Having engaged
with the text, I may be in a better position to know
what my fore-structure is.
Gadamer’s analysis of the relation between the
fore-structure and the new object echoes Heidegger:
It is necessary to keep one’s gazes fixed on the
things throughout all the constant distractions that
originate in the interpreter himself. A person who
is trying to understand a text is always projecting.
He projects a meaning for the text as a whole as
soon as some initial meaning emerges in the
text . . . Working out this fore-projection which is
constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he
penetrates into the meaning, is understanding
what is there (1990, p. 267).
Rather than putting ones preconceptions upfront
before doing interpretation, one may only get to
know what the preconceptions (or at least some of
them) are once the interpretation is underway. One
may only come to know what ones assumptions are
when engaging closely with the object in front of
one.
However, this is itself a dynamic process:
Every revision of the fore-projection is capable of
projecting before itself a new projection of mean-
ing; rival projects can emerge side by side until it
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becomes clearer what the unity of meaning is;
interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that
are replaced by more suitable ones. This cons-
tant process of new projection constitutes the
movement of understanding and interpretation
(p. 267).
Therefore, in practice, one may only begin to see
some of one’s fore-understandings as one endea-
vours to make sense of what this person is saying.
However, that awareness of the fore-understandings
may itself be fleeting as the process of interpretation
changes the fore-understandings to new ones.
The appearing
In Being and Time, Heidegger (1962) articulates
the case for a hermeneutic phenomenology, derived
from an etymological definition of the word phe-
nomenology itself. He argues the word is made
up of two parts derived from the Greek ‘‘phenom-
enon’’ and ‘‘logos’’. Phenomenon can be translated
as ‘‘show’’ or ‘‘appear’’. However, this immedia-
tely gets into a question of interpretation! To say
phenomenology is about the appearance of some-
thing suggests a number of different possibilities, e.g.
(1) the thing at the surface as opposed to something
deeper beneath the surface; (2) another thing that
resembles but which is different from this thing; (3)
something attending, as in a person arriving at a
function.
Heiddeger carefully dissects the various meanings
that can appertain to appearance in order to show
how he interprets the ‘‘appearance’’ of phenomen-
ology. In the active, verb form particularly, to say
something appears suggests it is entering a new state,
as it is coming forth, presenting itself to us, in
contrast to a previous state where it was not present.
This is how Heiddeger reads phenomenology that is,
therefore, concerned with the thing as it shows itself,
as it is brought to light:
Manifestly it is something that proximally and for
the most part does not show itself at all; it is
something that lies hidden in contrast to that
which proximally and for the most part does show
itself but at the same time it is something that
belongs to what this shows itself and it belongs to
it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its
ground (p. 59).
Heidegger’s phenomenology is concerned with
examining something usually latent as it emerges
from underneath into the light. However, it is also
interested in examining the manifest thing that
appears at the surface as this is integrally connected
with the deeper latent form*which it is, therefore,
both part of and apart from.
Logos can be variously translated as e.g.: dis-
course, reason, judgement and so is even harder to
pin down precisely. However, it seems fair to say that
while phenomenon seems primarily perceptual, lo-
gos is primarily analytical. Therefore, the aim of this
type of phenomenology is to examine the thing itself
as it appears to show itself but analytic work/reason
may be required to facilitate and to help grasp the
showing. The phenomenon appears but the phe-
nomenologist can help make sense of the appearing.
This microanalysis of the terms involved therefore
takes Heidegger down the hermeneutic road, as
Moran (2000) points out:
Phenomenology is seeking after a meaning which
is perhaps hidden by the entity’s mode of appear-
ing. In that case the proper model for seeking
meaning is the interpretation of a text and for this
reason Heidegger links phenomenology with her-
meneutics. How things appear or are covered up
must be explicitly studied. The things themselves
always present themselves in a manner which is at
the same time self-concealing (p. 229).
Dynamics
The metaphors of movement invoked in much of the
discussion of hermeneutics (circling, appearing etc)
work so well for me because they point to inter-
pretation as a dynamic rather than a linear or static
process. They also suggest the energizing potentiality
of qualitative analysis. Yes, hermeneutic activity is
demanding, keeps you on your toes; but with the
right material and the right spirit, it can also be
exhilarating. Duke (1977) speaks to some of this:
It is the motion in hermeneutics which in the final
analysis makes it an art. Focusing upon a text the
interpreter is suspended between its universal and
particular aspects. Hermeneutics requires agility,
an ability to weave from grammatical to psycho-
logical side and from comparative to divinatory
method. Furthermore interpretation involves con-
stant movement back and forth, for it is always
open to revision and supplementation. Since the
life of the language and the life of the person form
an infinite horizon, perfect understanding is an
ideal which is ever approximated but never
attained (p. 6).
I think that this is a beautiful and pithy passage.
The only thing I would take issue with or proble-
matize is the notion that this ‘‘makes it an art’’. I do
not disagree with that but would say that, for me, the
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qualities invoked can also be described as making it a
‘‘science’’!
In practice: identity, pregnancy and transition
to motherhood
I will now look at some of my empirical work
through the lens of the hermeneutic ideas discussed
above. This is itself an interesting dialogue between
old and new. When thinking through these theore-
tical ideas they brought to mind again some data I
had collected and analysed previously. That data
were from a project on identity change during the
transition to motherhood (Smith, 1994, 1999). So,
in a sense, that old work of mine came to life again,
shone again with a new brightness, as a result of
reading the hermeneutic ideas. Interesting then that
the old old (hermeneutics) reinvigorated the new old
(my research project).
The study explored women’s experience of preg-
nancy and transition to motherhood and the impact
of the transition on the woman’s self and identity.
One context for the research was that most existing
research was quantitative and medicalized, empha-
sizing problems associated with pregnancy. In con-
trast to this, I wished to conduct a study concerned
with the lived experience of what is for most women
a positive transition.
My study was qualitative and longitudinal, I
saw each woman four times, in early, mid and late
pregnancy and once about five months after
the birth of her child. I collected a range of pieces
of data. Semi-structured interviews were conducted
at each visit. In between, they kept a diary on the
process and they wrote some other personal ac-
counts at various times. For each woman I had
approximately 20 data points. The data was analysed
within case before moving to a cross-case analysis.
Angela
Here I will show a small part of the data from one
woman. At the time of the study, Angela is aged 25
and works as a bank clerk (details have been changed
to protect her confidentiality). To allow you to get
some sense of the experience of getting to know
Angela that I had when reading her material, Table I
shows a sequence of material from her diary. The
sequence begins with some short extracts and this is
followed by two almost complete extracts.
Levels of interpretation
There is some early general talk about her baby and
then considerable engagement with events happen-
ing for the other couple and she reflects on this in
relation to her own pregnancy. Now let us do some
closer hermeneutics and link it to the ideas presented
earlier in the paper. The local analysis of the material
presented here was that which I produced at the
time. The hermeneutics helps me understand how
the analytic process worked.
As I was reading the beginning of the last extract,
‘‘the baby is lovely’’, something happened to me.
The phrase stood out, stuck with me. Actually, it
seems to be quite ordinary, benign but almost
cliche´d. So why did it affect me? Let us look more
closely.
Grammatical and psychological interpretation
The phrase has anaphoric ambiguity. Whose baby is
lovely? Angela’s or the neighbour’s? It may seem that
the obvious reading is that ‘‘the baby is lovely’’ is
referring to her neighbour’s baby but there is actually
evidence pointing both ways.
Neighbour’s
This reading would pick up on the excitement
expressed in the previous entry around the birth of
the neighbour’s child and suggest Angela is talking
about having seen that recently born baby.
Angela’s
A sequence of references to the baby through the
diary entries forms a set, so that when we read, ‘‘the
baby is lovely’’, the already signals Angela’s. In
contrast, her neighbour’s baby is referred to in
close proximity as her baby twice. Therefore, a
code emerges the/Angela’s, her/the neighbour’s.
Further, in an extract a little earlier, Angela saw her
Table I. Extracts from Angela’s diary
I feel very different toward the baby now. (20 weeks)
I have not had a scan yet, so I feel a little apprehensive as to
whether the baby is developing properly. (22 weeks)
We can now see the baby moving. (26 weeks)
The neighbour over the road had her baby this morning.
Her husband came to see us at lunch time to tell us. . . . I
can’t wait to see the baby. I even feel slightly envious that
she has had her baby and I have got to wait another 12
weeks. (28 weeks)
The baby is lovely. I saw her on Monday and Sara came
home from hospital on Thursday. They are coping very
well and are loving every minute of it. It is amazing how
many people who live around us have been to see the baby
and given gifts. I really feel maternal when I hold the baby.
It is so strange to feel this constant happiness and
excitement everybody around me has noticed the differ-
ence. They all say that I am more laid back and agreeable
than I used to be. (29 weeks)
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baby on a scan and so it is now plausible that she
refers again to its appearance.
Therefore, I would say there is, in this case,
plausible evidence for either reading. One might
say that what I was doing when I was doing this
initial analysis represents a form of Schleiermacher’s
grammatical interpretation and while the gramma-
tical interpretation points to the ambiguity and let us
spell it out, it does not really help us do the
disambiguating.
Therefore, it is helpful to turn to a psychological
interpretation and I see this, as did Schleiermacher, as
being complementary, not in opposition. Psycholo-
gically, we can talk about some identity slippage
happening during Angela’s pregnancy, as she is
absorbed both by her own and her friend’s pregnancy:
. Angela feels she shares something experientially
with her pregnant neighbour.
. The expression of pleasure of the other couple
parallels her own with her husband.
. Perhaps this propensity for psychological con-
vergence provides important psychosocial pre-
paration for Angela, as she becomes a mother.
. In addition, it may be that the ambiguity
signifies or captures in some way that conver-
gence- Angela is actually thinking about both
babies at the same time.
My reading of what is going on is that the
ambiguity inherent in the phrase ‘‘the baby is lovely’’
actually reflects some opening up of identity bound-
aries. Increasingly caught up in the pregnancy
project of both herself and her neighbour, her
attention shifts rapidly between the two sites. There-
fore, the ambiguity makes sense because Angela is in
fact referring to both babies.
I think this is, therefore, a good illustration of
Schleiermacher’s point. There is something impor-
tant going on here linguistically and psychologically.
They complement each other and they should not
be separated out. When analyzing the language, I am
also analyzing the person. My analysis of the person
helps make sense of my analysis of the language.
Part and whole
We can parse the process again, in terms of the
hermeneutic circle. So taking the single extract ‘‘the
baby is lovely’’ again, here we have a part. We
interpret it in relation to a series of concentric circles,
which offer the whole, or rather a series of wholes:
. The single diary extract
. The sequence of diary extracts
. Other things we know of Angela
Thus reading the sentence within its extract gives
us more information. Then looking at the sentence
within the larger sequence of diary extracts informs
our reading. Finally, we can draw on other knowl-
edge we have acquired about Angela during the
project which helps illuminate this particular sen-
tence. For example, it is informative that when
interviewed at three months pregnant Angela de-
scribed herself as rather cold towards pregnancy and
babies. This adds force to the reading that contact
with the pregnant neighbour has helped her engage-
ment with the mothering identity. The series of
wholes illuminate the part and help the meaning to
shine forth from it. Ambiguity in the part helps us
see something going on in the whole*a sort of
identity slippage in Angela.
Going round the circle again: extending the
conversation
I went back to Angela five months after the birth, to
talk about her account of pregnancy. This was not
‘‘member validation’’ but rather an extension of the
interpretative process through dialogically ‘‘digging
more deeply’’ (Mulkay, 1985, p. 76). Most inter-
pretative dialogues are virtual, in our heads, even in
Gadamer, the lover of conversation. Here is a literal
version: a conversation about a conversation.
First Angela was reminded of what she had
written, without my giving her any of my own
analytic interpretations. Angela responded:
Every time I thought ‘I don’t know what I’m going
to do’, I could go over there and that could be my
baby for ten minutes, that’s how I felt, that if I
picked her up she was mine for a little while, and it
helped me to come to terms with what it was really
like. . . . I then realized that yeah, it must be an
ordeal to go through for that to be able to result,
and so I could understand things better and then I
began to unwind.
This confirms that contact with friend/baby helps
her cope with difficulties of pregnancy. There is fluid
ownership of the child. It can become hers and this
helps with the process.
I then read out my own provisional interpretation,
along the lines presented above and I asked Angela
for her reaction:
Now you’ve read it out, anyone would assume I
was talking about my own . . . I didn’t think of it as
being anyone else’s when I picked it up. They were
completely out of the picture . . . It was just a baby
that could so easily have been mine . . . I felt an
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instant attraction to the baby and I think that I
could have done that to any baby.
So here, we have a claim from Angela herself
that is even stronger than the one I was making. Not
only is ownership fluid, it is almost as though any
child is for her. Therefore, ‘‘the baby is lovely’’ is a
universal referent*all babies are lovely and all
babies are hers.
This is clearly a major rite of passage for Angela
given her previous indifferent or detached attitude. It
also seems to represent a clear example of the
symbiotic nature of identity roles. Preparation for
becoming a mother is aided by contact with a
woman more advanced in pregnancy. Holding this
other newborn baby acts as a rehearsal for her own
mothering. So strong is the connection, it is as
though this other child and any other becomes her
own, and this is neatly captured in the ambiguities of
the diary.
This was powerful as a research process. I had
produced an analysis that might seem contentious.
Going back to the woman herself, my analysis
actually becomes somewhat conservative when set
against the woman’s own.
The fleeting fore-understanding
Now let us look at what was happening in the project
in terms of fore-understandings, as discussed by
Heidegger and Gadamer.
When I began the project, I had an interest in
identity and so became curious about how preg-
nancy might affect identity. In order to keep the
project open, I had a loosely structured interview/
diary guide. During the course of the project, the
women talked a lot about their relationships with
significant others*partner, mother, pregnant
friends. Therefore, they brought this into the project.
This is to such an extent that in the end I theorized
the material in terms of the relational self: women
use relations with key others to help prepare for
becoming a new person, a mother (Smith, 1999).
That in a sense can be described as the natural
history of the analysis. More locally, during the
course of the analysis I realized that my existing
notion of identity had been, in one sense, individua-
listic. Partly influenced by the contemporary philo-
sophy literature I saw pregnancy as representing a
metamorphosis, where one identity becomes two.
Nevertheless, I had not seen this operating in the
wider context*a nexus of cross cutting relationships
which influence the process. Therefore, my interview
schedule had not had questions about social rela-
tions with others. I had been so preoccupied with the
woman’s relation with herself!
However, importantly, I would not have been able
to articulate this fore-understanding before talking
to the women. Therefore, illustrating Heidegger and
Gadamer’s point, here is an example of where a fore-
understanding lay pretty deep, dormant, implicit.
Confronting the new, the strange, the other, this new
data forced a collision of fore-understanding and
material not fitting with it and, as a result of the
conflict, the fore-understanding dramatically came
alive, became apparent.
However, the very confrontation and the process
of recognition changed the fore-understanding,
maybe irreversibly. Suddenly I could see my pre-
conception and see, starkly, that it did not fit
what was happening now and how the women were
talking and thinking. Therefore, this experience
changed my fore-understanding. I now had a new
fore-understanding, which included a much more
social picture of identity development.
Therefore, an interesting question is, at what point
would it have actually been possible to pin point that
more individualistic fore-understanding, articulate it
as one actually held by me at the time? It could not
have been before the project*I was not aware of it.
It could not have been after the project*I no longer
had it. Indeed, it disappeared almost as soon as it
was recognized, replaced by a new one, informed by
the new experience. The opportunity for me to have
said ‘‘Oh yes my fore-understanding of identity is
quite individualistic’’ was actually incredibly fleeting.
The appearing
Finally, I think we also have in this piece of analysis
a nice instance of Heidegger’s ‘‘appearing’’. ‘‘The
baby is lovely’’ is at the surface, is the manifest, the
appearance. Notionally it is rather a saccharine,
thin, cliche´d remark but when I read it, I felt
something, felt that something else was going on.
This led me to dig deeper. As a result of the process
of interpretation, through doing the thinking, dig-
ging, connecting, then the latent meaning appears
and connects with the manifest. We have come to see
that the statement that seemed quite thin is actually
powerful, pivotal and incredibly illuminating. In-
deed, one can say that the ‘‘meaning’’ of the phrase is
in the appearance and in the appearing.
Conclusion
I hope I have provided an illustration of how
contemporary human sciences and health research
connects with and can usefully draw on hermeneu-
tics and sometimes in a way which can help enliven
the hermeneutic literature as well. Thus, for exam-
ple, by changing the site of attention from the
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humanities to the human sciences, I have suggested
that the ideas of Schleiermacher, which were con-
tested by Gadamer suddenly, sound fresh, contem-
porary and useful. The hermeneutic ideas and my
research project themselves form a hermeneutic
circle. The theory helped me to see more clearly
what was happening in my research project, and my
research project helped me to see more clearly what
was going on in the theory. I hope readers too have
felt they could join in that circle for a while.
I am left feeling there is still a gap, however: When
I try to make sense of this person saying this thing,
what is actually happening? Interpretation is a
mystery, invokes a sense of wonder and I’m not
sure the hermeneutic theory has got near to explain-
ing or saying all there is to say about that mysterious
process. Partly because the type of encounter en-
visaged by hermeneutics was different, when it
comes to explaining what is happening when one
person tries to make sense of what another person is
saying, I would suggest there is still a great deal that
remains unknown.
Therefore, I would offer a suggestion for going the
other way round this particular hermeneutic circle. I
think there would be considerable value in a
programme of qualitative empirical human science
research focused on the interpretation process. So
what sort of questions do I have in mind for this
research project? Think about my reaction to Angela
writing, ‘‘the baby is lovely’’. What triggers my
response to that phrase? How can we describe what
my response is? What guides the interpretative
search? The analysis would attempt to document,
explore and make sense of this sort of process.
Therefore, what I am proposing is a different type
of project linking hermeneutics and the human
sciences. So far, the direction has tended to be using
the hermeneutics to make sense of the human
sciences. Here is the possibility of working the other
way*using the human sciences to help make sense
of, and extend, the hermeneutics.
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